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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, ^
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
THE STEELE RANCH, a Utah Corporation, et al.,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
13544

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a condemnation action by the Utah State
Road Commission to acquire certain real property in
Juab County for the purpose of constructing a Project
of the 1-15 Freeway.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After the trial of this matter the State Road Commission made a motion for a new trial which was denied
by the District Court.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Utah State Road Commission, Plaintiff-Appellant in the action seeks a reversal of the court's denial
together with an order that the case be remanded for new
trial before a neutral jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
By this action in Eminent Domain the State of Utah
sought to acquire 66.33 acres in fee and 5.45 acres in
temporary easement from the Steele Ranch Corporation
lands of about 2500 acres total in northern Juab County
for the 1-15 freeway. At the time of condemnation a portion of the ranch lands were being purchased from
McPhersons and Howards resulting in the initial filing
of three separate lawsuits (State v. Steele Ranch Corporation, Civil No. 4632; State v. McPherson, et al., Civil
No. 4634 and State v. Howard, et al., Civil No. 4633).
The three cases were consolidated as one case for trial
and also for appeal under State v. Steele Ranch Corporation, et al., Supreme Court No. 13544.
Defendant Steele Ranch Corporation is owned by
Dr. John G. Steele, M.D., a Nephi physician who lives
at his home, a small plot of approximately one acre adjoining the ranch but reserved in personal ownership for
his house and adjoining swimming pool. The non-access
freeway divided the ranch into an east portion and west
portion with access through the freeway provided by an
underpass on the east-west lA section line in Section 27.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
A map illustrating the pertinent portion of the ranch
and freeway is included at the end of this brief as a reference for the convenience of the court.
After the pre-trial order and just before trial, the
court granted defendant's motion to join John G. Steele
and his wife Thelma personally as defendants (File 4634
at P. 68) but failed to expressly rule on plaintiff's Motion
in Limine (File No. 4634 at P. 56), both motions being
heard on the same day and taken under advisement.
At trial on September 19, 20 and 21, 1973, the range
of testimony was presented as follows:
Mr. Victor Smith for the State (T. 220-224)
Land taken
Severance
Total

$ 18,245.50
21,057.70
$ 39,303.20

Mr. Wilbur Harding for Defendant (T. 153-157,
172)
Land taken
Severance (approximately)
Total

$ 20,518.50
47,781.25
$ 68,299.75

John G. Steele owner (T. 115, 117)
Land taken
Severance
Total

$ 27,852.00
300,000.00
$127,852.00

The jury award was $21,164.50 for land taken and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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$75,000 for severance damage or a total of $96,164.50 (File
No. 4634 at P. 150) almost $30,000 more than the testimony of defendant's own witness. After the Judgment
on the Verdict was entered the state made a motion for
new trial which was denied resulting in this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF A SEPARATE PARCEL AS
PART OF THE TOTAL TRACT OF SUBJECT PROPERTY WHERE NEITHER THE
OWNERSHIP NOR THE USE OF THE SEPARATE PARCEL WERE THE SAME AS
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The land acquired by the state for highway purposes
was a portion of a 2500 acre tract owned by Steele Ranch
Corporation. John G. Steele was the sole owner of the
stock of the corporation (Tr. 90). Adjacent to the ranch
property is a one acre tract which is not owned by the
corporation but which is separately owned by Dr. Steele
as an individual (Tr. 90). This one acre tract contains
only Steele's home and swimming pool. None of the out
buildings or corrals which may be associated with the
operation of the ranch are located on the one acre (Defendant's Exhibits 9-1, 9-2, 9-23). Evidence concerning
the effect of the freeway on the separate home area was
adduced at trial over the state's objection (Tr. 91, 93,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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119). Appellant submits that the objection was proper
and that the evidence should not have been admitted.
First, severance damages are not allowed to land
which has a different owner than that of the tract from
which property was condemned.
It is, of course, essential to constitute a
single parcel that it be owned in its entirety by
one owner or one set of owners. Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14.31(2).
In this case, the owner of the tract from which property
was condemned is not the same as the owner of the home
area. The oorporation owned the condemned property
while Dr. Steele himself owned the home area. Therefore, the two parcels cannot constitute a single tract for
the purpose of awarding severance damages for the latter.
The corporation is the only party from which land was
acquired. It is recognized by the law as a legal person.
Steele, although he owns 100% of the stock of the Steele
Ranch, has no interest in the land. The land is owned
by the corporation, a separate legal entity. His personal
ownership is limited to the corporate stock. The stockholder has created the corporation and the separate legal
ownership of the property. He cannot waive the existence
of that entity when the chosen form works to his disadvantage.
The leading case on the matter of severance damages when there is a separation of ownership between individuals and a private oorporation created by them is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 121 N. W. 2d 235, 95
A. L. R. 2d 880 (1963). The facts in that case are similar
to those in the Steele Ranch case. In the Jonas case, the
taking was of land owned by the individuals. They sought
to have adjoining land owned by a corporation which
they controlled considered as part of the same parcel.
The court refused to allow such consideration, saying:
A corporation is treated as an entity separate from its stockholders under all ordinary
circumstances. Although courts have made exceptions under some circumstances, this has been
done where applying the corporate fiction "would
accomplish some fraudulent purpose, operate as
a constructive fraud, or defeat some strong equitable claim . . . ." Those who are responsible for
the existence of the corporation are, in those
situations, prevented from using its separate existence to accomplish an unconscionable result.
In the present case, those who created the corporation in order to enjoy its advantages flowing from its existence as a separate entity are
asking that such existence be disregarded where
it works a disadvantage to them. We do not
consider it good policy to do so. Id., 121 N. W.
2d 235.
The Jonas case was recently cited by the Nebraska
court as authority for refusing to disregard the corporate
entity in a condemnation action. The court said that
there had been no showing of any of the factors listed
in Jonas as grounds for disregarding the corporation.
Verzani v. State, 195 N. W. 2d 762 (Neb. 1972). The
Nebraska court concluded that a corporation and its
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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stockholders are not considered as one and the same in
a condemnation action because the different legal personality of the corporate entity cannot be disregarded.
Utah law is clear that a defendant cannot recover
damages to land it does not own even though it may be
used in connection with adjoining land. State v. LeSourd,
24 Utah 2d 383, 472 P. 2d 939 (1970). The corporation
does not own the home area, the owner of the ranch and
the owners of the home are different persons, and the
result is that there is no unity of title as required to include the home area as part of the subject property.
Secondly, to be included in the subject tract the
separate parcel must be used in a way which is inseperably connected with the subject tract before the parcel
can be designated as a part of the tract.
. . . implicit in the definition of unity of use is
the connotation that both parcels are so completely integrated, inseparable and inter-dependent so as to make the operation of one impossible without the operation of the other. Sams
v. Redevelopment Authority, 431 Pa. 240, 244
A. 2d 779 (1968).
Such connection does not exist in this case. The
home and swimming pool are the residence of a physician.
While the home is near the subject tract the ranch operation is not dependent upon the location of a doctor's
home. The day to day operation of the ranch is conducted by the foreman who lives in the "ranch house"
at the end of the county road east of the freeway (T.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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121). The ranch house "over east" is also where the
equipment is stored and maintained (T. 132). John Steele
could live in any nearby city without affecting the value
or the operation of the ranch. He could sell either the
ranch or his home independently of the other. The fact
is that the nearness of his home is not necessary to the
ranch and just because he chooses to live close to the
ranch does not compel the conclusion that the ranch is
dependent upon his home.
It is submitted that the court erred in allowing testimony regarding a separate parcel where there was insufficient unity of title and usage.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE WHICH
RESULTED IN AN EXCESSIVE VERDICT
AND ONE GIVEN UNDER PREJUDICE.
The basic rule of law relative to any jury trial is
that the jury must be fair and impartial to both parties.
50 C. J. S. Juries, Sec. 226. It is submitted that a fair
trial was not had in this matter.
As the jury was selected at the outset of the trial
many of the jurors knew Dr. Steele and several stated
that he was their family doctor. Mr. Linton, presumably
a patient, was excused without motion from either party
(T. 18), as was Mr. Laird, the forest ranger (T. 14). Two
other jurors were challenged for cause by the state. Mrs.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Howard was challenged because Dr. Steele was her family doctor (T. 15), and who would be her doctor if "needed
in a minute" (T. 27), also because her husband was currently Dr. Steele's insurance agent (T. 27), and because
she seemed to have a reservation about the law of eminent domain (T. 28). Mr. Jenkins was challenged because Dr. Steele was his family doctor (T. 19), because
his mother was currently a patient seeing the doctor (T.
19) and because he was not sure whether that relationship might influence his judgment (T. 20).
The court at first granted the state's challenges, as
was proper (T. 31), then promptly reversed itself and
denied the same challenges (T. 32). This reversal and
denial of its challenges was prejudicial to the state since
the state was then compelled to utilize the pre-emptory
challenges for those jurors which the court would not
remove for cause. The result was that four jurors were
left who held a family doctor relationship with Dr. Steele
and were called to pass judgment on the defendant's case:
Mr. Mackey (T. 16), Mrs. Ballow (T. 17), Mr. Pickering,
whose daughter was Dr. Steele's patient (T. 23) and
Mr. Jones who owed a bill to Dr. Steele (T. 26). If Mr.
Laird and Mr. Linton were removed for cause so should
these others have been removed by the court.
The court's error resulted in a situation where persons with an extremely close relationship with Dr. Steele
had to pass judgment on him and his case. While the
family doctor relationship may not be specified in statutes, it is one founded on high trust and one which by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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its very nature is extremely close and intimate, in some
respects more so than the relation between family members or husband and wife; yet a relative or a spouse
would never be allowed to sit in judgment. To ask those
with such a close relation to pass judgment is error.
The trend of authority is to exclude from
juries all persons who by reason of their business
or social relations past or present, with either of
the parties, could be suspected of possible bias,
even though the particular status or relation is
not enumerated in the statutes declaring the
qualifications of jurors and the grounds of challenge. 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury, Sec. 321.
The state submits that the court erred and that its
error was prejudicial to the state. The bias of the jury
becomes clear when viewed in the perspective of the verdict almost $30,000 over the defendant's own witness.
Where a verdict is clearly excessive and results from such
bias and prejudice it is reversible.
Where we can say, as a matter of law, that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion for new trial, we may order the
verdict set aside and a new trial granted. State
v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347 (1968).
The state submits that under the circumstances of
the trial of this matter the state was prevented from
having a fair trial, and the Judgment on the Verdict ought
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to be reversed and presented before a new and neutral
panel of jurors.
POINT III.

THE VERDICT WAS EXCESSIVE AND
CONTRARY TO THE CLEAR PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE REVERSED.
Two expert valuation witnesses submitted their opinions at trial. Mr. Wilbur Harding testified for defendant,
approximately $20,518.50 for land taken and approximately $47,781.25 for severance damage for a rounded
total of $68,300 (T. 153-157,172). Mr. Victor Smith testified for the state that $18,245.50 was for land taken and
$21,057.70 for severance damage for a total of $39,303.20
(T. 220-224). The defendant testified to $27,852.00 for
land taken and $100,000.00 for severance damage, for a
total of $127,852.00 (T. 115, 117).
The jury awarded $21,164.50 for land taken and
$75,000 for severance damage for a total of $96,164.50
(file 4634, P. 150). In making the award the jury chose
to completely ignore the testimony of either expert appraiser and awarded about $30,000 in excess of the testimony of defendant's own witness as to market value
and damage. In so doing the jury chose the personal,
inexpert, unobjective feelings of Dr. Steele himself rather
than the clear preponderance of expert opinion based on
market values and experience.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is submitted that under the circumstances of this
trial, when the special relation of family doctor to some
of the jurors is taken together with the excessive award
made by the jury, the obvious and inescapable conclusion
is that the award was made under bias and prejudice. A
verdict excessive or arrived at under prejudice must be
set aside. A verdict might be allowed to stand. . . .
unless it is clearly and palpably, or flagrantly,
against the weight of the evidence; or unless it
appears that the jury have committed gross and
palpable error, or have acted under improper
bias, influence, or prejudice, or have mistaken
the rules of law stating the measure of damages,
or have rendered a verdict so excessive as to
shock the enlightened conscience of the court.
27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, 471.
The state submits that the verdict in the instant case
was excessive, was arrived at under prejudice and was
against the clear preponderance of the evidence at trial
and therefore cannot be allowed to stand.
In the case of State v. Barnes, 443 P. 2d 16 (Mont.
1968), the Montana Supreme Court reversed a lower court
and held that a new trial was proper when the jury returned a land value above the expert's opinion, even
though the total award of $44,379 was well under the
highest total testimony of $92,000 by Mr. Barnes the
landowner. The court in Barnes said:
It is a fundamental and well established
rule of law that the burden of proof as to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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amount of damages in condemnation proceedings
is upon the property owner. Here, by expert
testimony, the highest figure for the land and
improvements taken was $9,856 and the trial
court erred in denying a motion for new trial
when the jury failed to find in this or a lesser
amount. State v. Barnes, 443 P. 2d 16 (Mont.
1968).
Utah law reveals one case where the verdict was
higher than the expert testimony as to severance damages. The district court denied a new trial, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to be heard
again because the verdict was excessive. The court said:
It is true that the verdict might be so grossly
excessive and disproportionate to the injury that
we could say from that fact alone that as a matter of law the verdict must have been arrived at
by passion or prejudice. (Emphasis added.) But
the facts must be such that the excess can be
determined as a matter of law, or the verdict
must be so excessive as to be shocking to one's
conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury. State
v. Silliman, 448 P. 2d 347, 22 Utah 2d 33 (1968).
It is submitted that the instant case is also a case where
the verdict cannot stand because it is grossly excessive,
and also because it is contrary to the evidence and because of the bias on the part of the jury.
In a second Utah case, State v. Dillree, 25 Utah 2d
184, 478 P. 2d 507 (1970), which has considered the question this court affirmed an award of $35,075, slightly over
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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$1,600 more (about 5%) than testified to by the defendant's expert witness. But that case is clearly distinguishable because there the "single fact that the verdict was
in excess" was the only item considered by the court,
whereas in the instant case jurors had a close relationship with defendant, the verdict was grossly excessive
over the expert's opinion (more than 40% higher) and
clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.
In the Dillree case Justice Henriod dissented arguing
that the defendant should be bound by the testimony of
his own expert witness. His logic is instructive in this
case:
He called this witness and should accept his
figure, since his evidence is no stronger than his
strongest link, much less its weakest, and his
own testimony obviously self-serving even by
the facts related in the main opinion, not based
on the accepted test for damages, should be restricted to the test of his own chosen expert witness based on market, not opinion value . . . It
would be unthinkable to affirm a jury's verdict
based on the value to the owner of his pride of
production that may be quite unattractive to
one cruising in the market overt. State v. Dillree,
25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P. 2d 507 (1970).
It is submitted here that because of the circumstances of the instant case the defendant must also be
bound by his own expert and that to affirm such a grossly
excessive award is to permit the jury to speculate on the
landowner's own biased statement of what he thinks he
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ought to be awarded and to disregard any considered
opinion of value as actually reflected in the market.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF THE ORIGINAL APPRAISAL
AND AMOUNT OF DEPOSIT BEFORE THE
JURY CONTRARY TO LAW.
During cross-examination of the state's expert appraiser, counsel for defendant asked Mr. Smith about
Exhibit D-12, the original appraisal which was the basis
for the deposit made at the time of the Order of Occupancy in this matter. Over objection the trial court allowed defendant's counsel to proceed with the line of
questioning (T. 238-241) and subsequently allowed Exhibit D-12 to be received in evidence, again over objection
(T. 245). To do so is clearly contrary to Utah Law:
If the motion (for Order of Occupancy) is
granted, the court or judge shall enter its order
requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent
to occupancy to file with the clerk of the court,
a sum equivalent to at least 75% of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to be condemned. The amount thus
fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion
only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on
final hearing. 78-34-9 U. C. A. as Amended. (Emphasis added.)
The legislature obviously chose to consider the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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amount of deposit as not being relevant to the court proceeding and by statute expressly instructed the court
that the amount "shall not be admitted in evidence on
final hearing." The court allowed the figure and exhibit
into evidence in direct contravention of the statute thereby allowing the jury to consider an irrelevant, immaterial
and highly confusing figure.
CONCLUSION
The verdict in this case exceeded the defendant's
own expert witness by almost $30,000. The court's error
in denying the state's challenges for cause prevented the
removal from the jury of those jurors having a close and
personal family doctor relation. Moreover, the verdict
was clearly grossly excessive over the defendant's own
expert witness and contrary to the preponderance of this
evidence. Such a verdict is given under prejudice and
must be reversed.
The court also erred in allowing evidence that the
separate parcel was part of an integrated ranch operation
where the ownership and usage of this separate parcel
are not the same. The erroneous admissions of that evidence before the jury caused the jury to speculate as to
severance damage to property not inseparably connected
with the ranch and therefore to property irrelevant and
immaterial to this lawsuit.
Moreover, the jury was confused by the erroneous
admission of evidence of the original appraisal and deDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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posit figure which was in no way relevant or material to
the issue of value at trial.
The state submits that the district court's errors are
substantial and that when considered in light of the special relation between some members of this jury and Dr.
Steele and when taken together with the grossly excessive
award, the verdict is found to have been given under
prejudice. The verdict must be reversed and the case
remanded for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

JOHN s. MCALLISTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
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